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Resumo
Este trabalho analisa, teoricamente, os efeitos do Programa Universidade para Todos (ProUni), introduzido 
pelo governo federal do Brasil no ano de 2005, sobre a qualidade da força de trabalho formada nas uni-
versidades privadas. Esse programa concede isenção fiscal para as universidades privadas que, em contra-
partida, fornecem bolsas de estudo para alunos provenientes de famílias de baixa renda. A análise sugere 
que a qualidade da força de trabalho pode aumentar ou diminuir dependendo de duas variáveis-chave: o 
formato da curva de oferta do setor universitário e o nível de preparação para cursar a universidade dos 
bolsistas vis-à-vis aos não-bolsistas. 
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abstRact
This paper analyzes theoretically the effects on the quality of the labor force of the introduction of the 
program called ProUni (Programa Universidade para Todos), adopted by the Brazilian government in 2005. 
This program consists of giving tax exemptions to private universities that provide scholarships to students 
coming from low income families. The analysis suggests that the quality of the labor force can either 
increase or decrease depending on two crucial variables: the shape of the university sector's supply curve 
and the level of preparation to face university studies of the students who are targeted by the program 
vis-à-vis the non-targeted ones. 
Key WoRds
ProUni, private university, affirmative action, efficiency
Jel classification
H0, H41, I22, I28
	 I	have	benefited	from	comments	and	discussions	with	Paulo	Barelli	and	Ernesto	Sepúlveda	and	participants	in	se-
minar	at	the	SBE	Meeting	in	Natal	in	2005	and	the	international	conference	on	“The	Quality	of	Education	in	Latin	
America	and	the	Caribbean”	in	Mexico	City	in	2007	.Obviouly,	all	remaining	errors	are	my	sole	responsability.
	 	Ibmec,	São	Paulo.	Endereço	para	contato:	Rua	Quatá,	300	–	4º	andar.	CEP:	04546-042	-	São	Paulo	–	SP	–	tel:	11-
4504-2300.	E-mail:	eduardo.andrade@isp.edu.br.
Recebido	em	março	de	2006.	Aceito	para	publicação	em	fevereiro	de	2007.
Est. econ., são Paulo, 37(3): 663-683, jul-set 2007
664 Effects of the Brazilian university Policy of targeting the Poor
IntRoDuctIon
In 2005, the Brazilian government introduced a program called ProUni (Programa 
Universidade para Todos) to finance university tuition to low income families’ stu-
dents. The program has two main characteristics. First, private universities receive 
tax exemptions if they provide one full scholarship for each 0,7 students regularly 
registered.2, Participation in the program is voluntary. However, if private universi-
ties adhere to the program, the agreement lasts for ten years and it can be renewed. 
Second, the eligible students to receive the new scholarships are those who studied 
all three years in public high schools. Moreover, their families must have a monthly 
income no greater than one and a half and three minimum wages, respectively, to 
receive full and partial (50% or 25%) scholarships.5 As in Brazil the best elementary 
and high schools are in general private, these students tend to be, on average, rela-
tively less prepared to face university studies. The students selected are those among 
the eligible ones who obtain the highest scores in the national exam called ENEM 
and are, as a last pre-requisite, selected by the private universities. 
Out of 52 private universities in the Brazilian educational system, 5 adhered to 
the program, which corresponds to almost 70% of the total. As a result of this high 
participation, 2,000 slots with scholarships were directed to students coming from 
low income families. This number corresponds to close to 7% of all slots available to 
new students in all private universities in Brazil in 200 whose selection were made 
through exam.7, 
The objective of this paper is to analyze theoretically the effects of this government’s 
program on the quality of the labor force. The focus on the quality of the labor 
force is a very important one for two main reasons. On the one hand, it affects the 
economic growth rate and the economy’s productivity. Hanushek and Kimko (2000) 
run a cross-country growth regression using data from 90 to 990. They found 
 For details, see http://www.presidencia.gov.br/ccivil_0/_Ato200-200/2005/Lei/L09.htm.
2 Universities that adhered to the program in 2005 had to provide only one full scholarship for each 9 
regularly registered students.
 To simplify, the term university also includes colleges and other institutions that provide tertiary 
education. With respect to the exemptions, they include reduction in corporate income tax and other 
contributions.
 Students who studied in private high school with scholarships are also eligible to take part in the 
program.
5 The minimum wage in Brazil in 2005 is equal to R$ 00 reais (or approximately US$ 2, using the 
exchange rate of July th, 2005).
 Families who can afford do send their children to private schools, even though they have the op-
tion of public education free of charge. The difference between the two types of school’s quality is 
significant.
7 Only 9% of all slots in all private universities in 200 are filled with students selected through other 
forms rather than exam.
 See MEC (200) for further details about the higher education in Brazil.
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that an increase of one standard deviation of labor force quality, measured by the 
grades obtained by students on mathematic and science tests, may enhance the real 
per capita growth rate by approximately .% per year. Bishop (99) suggests that 
a drop in the american students’ performance in the exam known as SAT, from 97 
to 90, coincides with the decline in the american economy’s productiviy. On the 
other hand, the quality of the labor force also affects the individuals. For example, 
Murphy and Peltzman (200) suggest that a drop in one standard deviation of the 
students’ performance in tests of proficiency leads to a reduction of % their average 
wage. This empirical evidence indicates the centrality of the nation’s human capital 
and, in particular, its quality.9
With this aim to explore the effects of ProUni on the quality of the labor force, I 
develop a two-period model with two main features. First, the university sector is 
modelled explicitly, assuming that there is a continuum of private universities autho-
rized by the government to function and they are price-takers. Second, there are two 
types of families. In families of the first type, parents have high level of human capital 
and can either send a child to university or not. If they do, there is a probability that 
a child who is sent to university becomes an individual with a high level of human 
capital, which depends positively on his or her level of preparation. In families of 
the second type, parents have low level of human capital and are credit constrained: 
they do not have enough resources to pay the university tuition. The government’s 
program’s target is clearly the latter type of families and its introduction can alter 
the allocation of human resources in the spots available in private universities, which 
affects the quality of the labor force. 
The analysis in this paper suggests the following. As a result of the introduction of 
the program, the quality of the labor force can either increase or decrease depending 
on two crucial variables: the university sector’s supply curve and the level of prepara-
tion to face university studies of the students who are the target of the program vis-
à-vis the non-target ones. Independently of the former, if the level of preparation of 
the beneficiaries of the program are greater, the quality of the labor force necessarily 
rises. The explanation is the following. By providing scholarships to credit constrained 
families, the program’s first effect is to increase the fraction of individuals who obtain 
the university degree. As a consequence, the skill premium reduces. Additionally, de-
pending on the university sector’s supply curve, the university tuition may increase. 
Combining these two effects, it makes not profitable for some families with high 
level of human capital to continue paying for a private education and obtain a lower 
immediate utility. Hence, they withdraw their children from university. As they are 
9 This empirical evidence considers the effects on the quality of the labor in the pre-college period, as 
there are exams that allow an international comparison. However, one should also expect a significant 
impact (possibly lower) of the quality of college education, the focus of this investigation, on the same 
variables.
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replaced by better students (the scholarships’ recipients), the quality of the labor force 
necessarily rises. Therefore, the program can increase efficiency and, at the same time, 
the income mobility. 
However, the most likely scenario is one in which the level of preparation of the ben-
eficiaries of the program is lower, as they come from public schools. Under this case, 
as more inelastic the university sector’s supply curve, the greater is the increase in 
the university tuition, as a consequence of the higher demand in the university sector 
caused by the program. There is also a reduction in the skill premium, which is not 
very significant as the level of preparation of the scholarship’s recipients are relatively 
low. Combining these two effects, a relatively large number of families with high level 
of human capital withdraw their children from university, who are now replaced by 
students with worse levels of preparation. As a consequence, the quality of the labor 
force is lower. Thus, the program increase the income mobility at the expense of less 
eficiency. There is a clear trade-off. 
In contrast, as more elastic the supply curve, the quality of the labor force increases 
after the introduction of the program and no trade-off between efficiency and equity 
exists. It occurs because the university tuition does not change significantly. As the 
skill premium also does not change significantly, there are relatively few families with 
high level of human capital withdrawing their children from university. Combining 
this effect with a relatively greater number of scholarship’s recipients entering the 
university, the final outcome is an increase in the fraction of individuals attending 
university and in the quality of the labor force. This result takes place despite the fact 
that the beneficiaries of the program are relatively less prepared to face university 
studies. One can say that that the quantity effect dominates. 
Thus, how the university sector responds to the increase in demand is crucial to un-
derstand the impact of the program. The overall level of idle capacity in the Brazilian 
private university sector is around 20%.0 However, this percentage is possibly not 
homogenous across different courses, which suggests that the effects of the program 
may also vary across courses. Moreover, government’s legislation that restricts the 
opening either of new universities or new slots in universities may play an important 
role in the program’s outcome, which I discuss in the final section of this paper. 
To my knowledge, this is the first paper that analyzes the recently implemented 
ProUni. It adapts a theoretical framework developed by Caucutt and Kumar (200), 
which analyzes the effects of increasing higher education subsidies in the US on 
inequality, welfare, and efficiency. Andrade (200) uses a different version of this 
0 The idle capacity number in the higher sector should be looked at with caution. The Ministry of 
Education is responsible for authorizing new places in most of the universities. As this process may take 
a long time, many universities demand new slots even if they do not plan to use them immediately.
Eduardo de carvalho andrade 667
Est. econ., são Paulo, 37(3): 663-683, jul-set 2007
paper in which the goal was to investigate theoretically the impact on efficiency of 
the introduction of quotas into the Brazilian public universities’ entrance system. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the structure 
of the model. Section 2 shows the competitive equilibrium without the government’s 
program. In section , the effects of the introduction of the program on the quality of 
the labor force are analyzed. The last section concludes, with special emphasis on the 
discussion about the level of idle capacity in the university sector in Brazil now and 
in the near future, as this variable is key to understand the effect of the program. 
1.  MoDEl
It is a two-period model. There are two types of families, which differ by the parent’s 
level of human capital. At time t = 0, parent has either a high or a low level of hu-
man capital. Each parent works, receives wages, decides whether to send his child to 
university, consumes, and dies. At time t = , his child becomes a worker with high 
or low level of human capital, depending on the educational decision of his parent, 
receives a wage, and consumes. The measure of each generation (and the number 
of workers in each period) is constant and is normalized to one. Let nh,t and nl,t be the 
fraction of individuals, respectively, with high and low levels of human capital at time 
t. Note that ,0 ,0=h hn n
*  and 
,0 ,0=l ln n
*  are exogenously given, and  ,0 ,0 = 1h ln n
* *+ . 
As I do not model the schooling decision, it is assumed that all children have a 
school degree and are able to attend university. However, they differ in their level of 
preparation to perform well at university and become an individual with a high level 
of human capital. A child with level of preparation a who attends university becomes 
an individual with high or low level of human capital, respectively, with probability 
π(a) and ( - π(a)). This feature of the model limits the heterogeneity to two levels 
of human capital, and therefore to two income levels, which simplifies the analysis. 
If a child does not attend university, he has the lower level of human capital with 
probability one. 
I assume that the distribution function for the level of preparation is different across 
types and identical within families of the same type, and all level of preparation draws 
are independent of each other. Let F(.) be the distribution function for the high in-
come families’ level of preparation on the support [ah,], and f(.) be the corresponding 
density function. Let G(.) be the distribution function for the low income families’ 
 As it is going to become clear in the next section, the low type individual ends up not sending their 
child to university as he is credit constrained.
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level of preparation on the support [0, la ], and g(.) be the corresponding density func-
tion. Note that 0 < la , < ah . 
Assumption 1: a ∈[0,], 0 ≤ π(a) ≤ 1, π ′(a) > 0, π′′(a) < 0, ∀a, and π( ah ) = 0. 
This feature of the model is motivated by the following. The level of preparation of 
an individual to attend university and acquire a high level of human capital is deter-
mined in great part by two factors. The first is the individual’s innate or cognitive 
ability, which is independent of the social environment where the individual grows 
up. There is no reason to assume that the distribution of this innate ability differ be-
tween groups of individuals who differ by family income status.2 The second factor 
is related to expenditures in education received by the individual before entering uni-
versity. This second factor is greatly affected by the income of the individual’s family. 
For example, high-income families are capable of paying for extra courses and better 
quality schools. This is particularly true in Brazil as high income families are able 
to afford private schools, which are in general better than public schools. Combining 
these two factors, it is set la  <  and 0 < ah . 
The parent whose child has level of preparation a has two options: sending the child 
to attend university or college (option c) or letting the child remain solely with a 
school degree (option s). Hence, the family’s problem can be written in the following 
way: 
	
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
,0 ,1 ,1
{ , }
,0 ,1
{ ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ;max
}, = ,
i i h l
c s
i l
u w P T a a u w a u w
u w u w i h l
*  − + + β p + −p 
+ β
	 (1)
where β (0 < β < ) is the discount factor, wi,t is the wage of individual with i level of 
human capital at time t, P* is the university tuition, Ti(a) is government’s transfer to 
family i with child’s level of preparation equal to a and the utility function has the 
usual properties. The first term indicates the university option. At t = 0, the family 
consumes its wage net of the tuition expenditures and sends its child to university. At 
t = , the child who becomes a worker either with high or low level of human capital 
earns his wage. The second term is the option of not sending the child to university 
at all: the child becomes a worker with low level of human capital.5,
2 See Heckman (995).
 See discussion in Becker (99).
 Below in this section, I explain which families receive transfers.
5 To simplify the analysis, the tuition P* is the only cost of higher education. This paper ignores the 
opportunity cost of foregone earnings, an important component of the cost of education, and assume 
that the child who do not attend university can not work at time t = 0.
 It is worth mentioning that parents’ income is not necessarily equal to their consumption as part of its 
income may be directed to invest in their children’s human capital. However, children’s consumption 
is equal to their income at t = .
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Two comments are worth noting before proceeding to describe production in this 
economy. First, the only type of bequest allowed in this model is through investments 
in education. Other types of bequests are not empirically relevant for most families, 
even in the most developed countries.7 Second, there is no capital market to finance 
education. This assumption is commonly used and widely accepted. In general, there 
are two types of uncertainties associated with investments in human capital. On the 
one hand, it is not clear if the student is capable of finishing his studies. This type of 
uncertainty is somehow modelled here through the probability p. On the other hand, 
after graduating, there is a moral hazard problem. The individual may not work prop-
erly or be a lazy person. As a consequence, he may not earn enough money to repay 
his debts. Although this possibility is not modelled here, it is implicitly incorportated 
by assuming the lack of a market to finance investiments in education. 
As in Andrade (200), there is a single non-storable good in the economy produced 
by firms operating in a competitive market. The inputs in the production process 
are the two types of labor, individuals with high and low levels of human capital. 
Therefore, there is no physical capital in this economy. The constant returns to scale 
production function is as follows: 
	
( ) ( )( )
1
, , , ,= 1
d d d
t h t l t l t h tY A N N N N θ + γ + −θ + e 
where A > 0, 0 < θ,e,d,γ < , γ < e. Nh,t and Nl,t are, respectively, the number of indi-
viduals with high and low levels of human capital employed in the production process 
at time t. Note that the possible values for the variables Nl,t and Nh,t are in the interval 
[0, ], as the number of workers in each period is constant and is normalized to one. 
Hence, total output can be expressed as a function of the fraction of individuals with 
a high level of human capital in each period. 
Both types of individuals provide two distinct productive services, which one may 
think of as mental effort (“brains”) and physical effort (“brawn”).9 The first and sec-
ond terms within the square brackets can be thought of, respectively, as “brain” and 
“brawn”, with the parameter θ indicating the importance of the mental effort. Thus, 
mental and physical efforts are combined into an aggregate by a CES technology with 
an elasticity of substitution, 1
1 d−
, that exceeds unity. The parameter e is the relative 
efficiency of the individuals with high level of human capital in supplying physical 
effort. Whereas the parameter γ is the relative efficiency of the individuals with low 
7 See Stokey (99) for an extensive discussion of this topic.
 See Becker (99) for an extensive discussion of this topic and Caucutt and Kumar (200).
9 This type of production function is used in Stokey (99), Caucutt and Kumar (200) and Andrade 
(200).
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level of human capital in providing the mental effort. Both parameters (e and γ) are 
important in determining the wage differential between the individuals with high 
and low level of human capital, as assumption 2 below indicates. 
There are two important ideas behind this production function. First, as γ is assumed 
to be close to zero, the individuals with high level of human capital are the main pro-
viders of “brain”. Second, as e < , the individuals with a high level of human capital 
can perform (almost) all the tasks that the other type of labor can, and more. The 
following assumption simplifies the analysis and guarantees that the wages paid to the 
individuals with a high level of human capital are always greater than the ones for the 
individuals with a low level of human capital, for all possible values for Nh,t and Nl,t. 
Assumption 2: e > ( )
1
11
1
d
å>
− −θ
  − γ θ 
.20
I now turn to the market for higher education. It is assumed that there is no free-en-
try and there is a continuum of universities with measure U. The maximum number 
of students that each university can have is equal to Qmax (that is, the maximum capac-
ity). University i’s profit (PRi) is given by: 
	 = (1 )i i i iPR P Q C Q t
* − − 
where t is the corporate income tax, Ci is university i’s marginal cost, Qi is the number 
of students enrolled in university i and P* is the market price. Universities have dif-
ferent marginal costs and its range is given by the interval min max,C C   . Recall that 
there is a continuum of universities with measure U. The universities are labeled ac-
cording with its marginal cost: from the one with the lowest marginal cost labeled 
i = 0 to the one with the highest marginal cost labeled i = U. 
These features of the model try to capture the main characteristics of the Brazilian 
education sector. This market is strongly regulated by the government. There is no 
free-entry as the government determines the number of of universities that can ope-
rate in each field of knowledge. Moreover, it specifies the number of slots that the 
university can have, that is, the maximum number of students that can be enrolled 
in each university. 
20 This assumption indicates that ɛ (the coefficient of the individual with a high level of human capital in 
the production of “brawn”) is large enough to guarantee that wh,t > wl,t.
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The government’s budget constraint has to be balanced. The revenue comes from 
the corporate income taxes on the universities imposed at t = 0. Government makes 
transfer denoted by T. Therefore: 
	
=i i ii P Q C Q tdi T
* − ∫
The last feature of the model is the following. I make the simplifying assumption that 
high income families whose children have the highest level of preparation (that is, 
a = ) receive all transfers from the government and all profits as they are assumed 
to own all universities. 
The motivation behing this assumption is the following. Note that these families are 
the richest with the brightest children. As next section shows, it certainly pays off for 
these families to finance their children’s tertiary education. The extra cash through 
transfers and profits does not affect their decision to invest in their children’s educa-
tion. They would make this decision anyway if their income was only their salaries. 
The only effect of this extra cash is to increase their consumption in the first period. 
As section  shows, the government’s university policy of targeting the poor affects 
the amount of transfers and profits. If they were channeled to families with lower 
income or with children with lower level of preparation, the amount of transfers and 
profits could distort and affect their decisions to send or not their children to univer-
sity. In order to avoid this possibility, I make this simplifying assumption. 
2.  coMPEtItIvE EQuIlIBRIuM
This section discusses the equilibrium of the model. First, it is important to recall 
that the focus of this paper is to analyze the effect of the government program of 
targeting poor families whose children are not enrolled in university. Hence, the 
type of equilibrium of interest is the one in which all low income families opt not to 
send their children to university. It can happen for two reasons. Either because they 
do not have enough income to pay the tuition (that is, wl,0 < P*) and can not borrow 
with this objective as there is no capital markets to finance education.; or because the 
potential increase in future utility if the child becomes an individual with high level 
of human capital does not compensate the reduction in current utility related to the 
payment of tuition P*. To simplify, I make the following assumption: 
Assumption 3: wl,0 < Cmin and wh,0	> Cmax. 
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In words, it indicates that low income families do not have income to pay the uni-
versity tuition. Their income is lower than the lowest possible university tuition, as 
the minimum possible marginal cost to provide the university service is Cmin. High 
income families do have enough income to pay tuition. 
It is worth characterizing the behavior of parents with high level of human capital 
with respect to the decision to send their child to university.  
Proposition 1: Given the equilibrium wages and university tuition, there exists an 
unique ah* [ah,], such that a parent with high level of human capital sends his child to 
university if a ≥ ah*, and does not otherwise.2 
This proposition indicates that there is threshold level of ability behavior. Parents with 
high level of human capital send their children to university only if their children’s 
level of preparation is greater than the threshold values ah*. If a child has a level of 
preparation lower than this threshold value, it is not profitable to pay for private 
education and obtain a lower immediate utility. This is the case because the expected 
future gain in utility, as a result of the expenditure P* in education today, is very 
small, as the probability of this child becoming an individual with a high level of 
human capital is very low. 
Before proceeding to define the competitive equilibrium in this economy, it is worth 
discussing the equilibrium in the university sector, which is characterized by a com-
petitive market. From the behavior of parents with high level of human capital, there 
is a certain number of students who attend university, say, D. There are two possible 
types of equilibrium. In the first one, there is no idle capacity in the university sector. 
Formally, D = UQ*, that is, the number of students enrolled in universities are equal 
to the number of slots available, the ones authorized by the government to operate. 
Hence, all universities are operating at full capacity and the equilibrium price is equal 
to P* = Cmax, as the least efficient universities (with the highest marginal cost given 
by Cmax) equate the marginal cost to price. In such environment, when the demand 
increases, it leads to a greater equilibrium price without any increase in the number 
of students enrolled in universities. In the second possible equilibrium, there is idle 
capacity in the university sector as D < UQ*. It means that the least efficient universi-
ties have the authorization to operate but there is no demand to fill their slots. The 
equilibrium price is such that Cmin ≤ P* < Cmax, as the least efficient universities with 
students equate their marginal cost (which is in the interval [Cmin,Cmax)) to the equi-
librium price. Under this circumstance, an increase in demand may lead to greater 
price and necessarily increases the number of university students. 
2  See in the appendix the proof of all propositions in this paper.
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In short, it is straightforward to conclude that, in equilibrium, there is a threshold 
C* such that universities with marginal cost: (i) greater than C* do not have students; 
(ii) lower than C* operate at full capacity; (iii) equal to C* have students but do not 
necessarily operate at full capacity. 
I now turn to the definition and the proof of existence and uniqueness of the 
equilibrium. 
Definition 1: Given *,0in , a competitive equilibrium is characterized by 
*
,1in , 
*
,0iw , 
*
,1iw , 
*P  
and *ha  ( ),1ha∈  such that ( ),= lhi : (i) given wages, firms maximize profits; (ii) given *P , 
universities maximize profits; (iii) the labor market clears, that is, * thth nN ,, =  and 
*
tltl nN ,, =  
( 0,1=t ); (iv) given wages and *P , *ha  solves the university decision problem of family with high 
level of human capital in (1); (v(v) the government budget constraint is balanced; and (vi) the law 
of motion for the variable hn , which is given by:
	 	 ,1 ,0
1
h h ah
n = n (a)f(a)da* * *p∫ 	 (2)
In order to understand the above law of motion, it is important to recall the following 
points. First, children from low income families do not attend university. Second, 
the number of individuals with high level of human capital at 0=t  is equal to *,0hn  
and each one has a child. Third, their children who attend the university are only 
those whose level of preparation is in the the interval ,1ha
*   . Finally, only a fraction 
of those students becomes an individual with high level of human capital at time t = , 
which is determined by the probability function π. Therefore, at t = , the number 
of individuals with high level of human capital is a fraction given by 1
ah
ð(a)f(a)da*∫  π(a)f ( )da of 
the current ones ( ),0hn* . 
Proposition 2: There exists a competitive equilibrium and it is unique.22
This unique equilibrium has the following characteristics. First, there are children 
coming from high income families who attend university. Second, the skill premium 
and the fraction of individuals with a high level of human capital at t =  are positive. 
Finally, a threshold marginal cost such that universities with higher costs do not have 
students and the ones with lower costs operate at full capacity. 
22 If one takes into consideration the opportunity cost of foregone earnings as an additional cost of higher 
education, the equilibrium would still be characterized by threshold ability. However, it would be 
greater as it would be an additional cost of attending university.
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3.  taRGEtInG tHE PooR
In this section, I analyze the effect of ProUni in the quality of the labor force. In 
the model, this quality is measured by the fraction of individuals with high level of 
human capital in period , the variable nh,. The goal is to check how nh, is affected, 
when one considers the possible changes in the equilibrium price in the university 
sector as a result of a greater demand caused by the introduction of the government 
program. 
As mentioned in the introduction, ProUni’s objective is to find a way to finance the 
private university tuition for students coming from low income families. The program 
has two important characteristics. First, only students whose families have an income 
level below a certain threshold are eligible to take part in the program. Those students 
take an exam and the ones with the highest scores obtain the scholarship. Second, 
it gives tax exemption to universities that give a certain minimum of full or partial 
scholarships to students enrolled in their program. 
The way that these two characteristics are incorporated into the model is the fol-
lowing. With respect to the first characteristic, families whose parents have the low 
level of human capital and an income of wl,0 are the ones eligible to take part in the 
program. In other words, it is assumed that wl,0 is lower than the income threshold 
level established in the program. Moreover, the students with the right to receive the 
scholarship are selected using a ranking of the individual’s level of preparation, which 
is assumed to be public information. They are the S individuals with the highest level 
of preparation among the ones coming from low income families, where S is the total 
number of scholarships. Implicitly, it is assumed that these individuals are the ones 
who obtain the highest scores in the exam that selects the students to receive the 
scholarships. Formally, the S indiviuals are the following: 
	
= ( ) ,l
al
aS g a da*∫
where al* is the lowest level of preparation of those individuals coming from low in-
come families who receive the scholarship. 
With respect to the second characteristic of the program, I assume that the mini-
mum number of full or partial scholarships an university has to offer to obtain the 
tax exemption and take part in the program is equal to αQmax, where α < . When 
operating at full capacity, university i’s profit if it decides to take part in the program 
is equal to: 
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max max= (1 ) (1 ) ,i iPR P Q C Q t F
** −a − − + 
where F is the tax exemption, P** is the new equilibrium price when the program is 
implemented. Obviously, this university decides to join the program only if it leads 
to a greater profit. Formally, this is the case when: 
	 ( )max 1F P Q t**≥ a − 	 (3)
that is, when total exemption is greater than the amount the university gives up in 
terms of net revenues by providing scholarships. 
It is obvious that if an university operating at full capacity is better off taking part in 
the program, then all universities join the program. To simplify the analysis, I assume 
that inequality () holds.2 With this assumption, total number of scholarships (S) is 
equal to αQmaxU. It is important to note that this simplifying assumption does not play 
any role in the results below. As it is going to be clear, one of the crucial aspects to 
evaluate how the program affects the quality of the labor force is through its impact 
on the university tuition (P*), which depends on the supply curve of the educational 
sector and not on what types of universities take part in the program.2
Before proceeding with the analysis, it is worth making on comment about the way 
the production in the education sector is modelled here. Obviously, the fixed cost 
is an important aspect of the production in this sector. However, those universities 
who can take part in ProUni are those who are already operating and have their full 
capacity determined by the government. Therefore, their decisions to join or not the 
program are made at the margin. This point explains the focus on the marginal cost 
in the analysis.25
I now turn to the effects of the program in nh,, first considering the case when the 
supply curve in the university sector is perfectly inelastic. 
Proposition 3: after the introduction of the program, if the university sector’s supply curve 
is perfectly inelastic and the level of preparation of targeted students vis-à-vis the non-tar-
geted ones is greater (lower), the quality of the labor force increases (decreases). 
2 As pointed out in the introduction, about 70% of all private universities adhered to the program. 
Therefore, this assumption is not really far from reality.
2 In order to guarantee that the government has enough resources to finance the program such that 
the condition () holds, adjustments can be made in the corporate income tax (t) or in the number of 
scholarships through a.
25 In propositions and below, the university sector’s supply curve can be, respectively, perfectly elastic and 
upward sloping. Therefore, implicitly it is assumed that new universities can enter into the market or 
old universities can increase their full capacity as a consequence of the initial impact of ProUni.
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The intuition behind this result is the following. When the program is introduced, 
there is an increase in demand in the university sector. As the supply curve is perfectly 
inelastic, it leads only to an increase in the university tuition, without any change 
in the total number of students enrolled in university. This new equilibrium price is 
such that it is not in the interest of αQmaxU students with the lowest level of prepara-
tion coming from high income families who were attending university without the 
program to continue doing so. Their families decide to withdraw their children from 
university as it is not profitable to pay the higher tuition for an university education 
and obtain a lower immediate utility. In other words, with the new equilibrium price, 
the costs are now greater than the benefits of enrolling in the university. 
These studentes are then replaced by the a UQmaxα  recipients of the scholarships, 
the students coming from low income families who are eligible to take part in the 
government’s program. When ** lh aa < , the level of preparation of these new stu-
dents are greater than the ones of the old students. They were not previously enrolled 
in university because they were credit constrainted (w0, < P* < P**). Thus, the 
government’s program is capable of increasing the quality of the students enrolled in 
universities, leading to a greater quality in the labor force in the future (greater ,1hn ). As 
a second order effect, this increase in ,1hn  reduces the expected skill premium in the 
future and high income families are less inclined to send their children to university. 
When this effect is taken into consideration, the new equilibrium price of university 
service and the new fraction of individuals with high level of human capital at time 
t =  are lower than otherwise. However, they are still greater than the ones without 
the government program. In this case (when ** lh aa < ), it is important to mention that 
there is no trade-off in terms of efficiency and income mobility. The government’s 
intervention not only increases the efficiency of the educational system (by increasing 
,1hn ), but it allows individuals coming from low income families to obtain a high 
level of human capital. Moreover, the skill premium is lower.
The reverse result occurs when > lha a
* as the new students have lower level of prepa-
ration. In this case, the overall quality of the labor force (nh,1) decreases after the in-
troduction of the program. Under this scenario, the government would spend resour-
ces through tax exemptions and reduce the efficiency of the educational system. There 
is now a clear trade-off between efficiency and income mobility: more income mobi-
lity is only possible at the cost of less efficiency. 
Proposition 4: after the introduction of the program, if the university sector’s supply curve 
is perfectly elastic, the quality of the labor force increases. 
The above result is a straightforward one and it is considered for the sake of com-
pleteness. The explanation is the following. When the supply curve is perfectly elas-
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tic, there is enough idle capacity in the university sector and the introduction of the 
government’s program does not cause any change in the university tuition. Hence, 
in the first moment, the old students’ families do not have any incentive to change 
their decisions to send their children to university. As a result, there are new αQmaxU 
university students and they receive scholarships. Recall that these students are the 
ones coming from low income families who do not have enough income to pay for 
the tuition. Therefore, the quality in the labor force in the future (measured by nh,) is 
necessarily greater. Note that this result does not depend on the level of the prepara-
tion of the new student vis-à-vis the other students as there is no replacement of stu-
dents when there is idle capacity in the system. As a second order effect, this increase 
in nh, reduces the expected skill premium in the future and high income families are 
less inclined to send their children to university. When this effect is taken into con-
sideration, the new fraction of individuals with high level of human capital at time 
t =  are lower than otherwise. But it is still greater than this same fraction without 
the program. In the case of perfectly elastic supply curve, the effect of the program is 
unequivocal: more efficiency and income mobility, with a lower skill premium. 
Proposition 5: after the introduction of the program, if the university sector’s supply curve 
is upward sloping and the level of preparation of targeted students vis-à-vis the non-targeted 
ones is greater (lower), the effect on the quality of the labor force is positive (uncertain). 
The above propostion presents the intermediary case when the supply curve is neither 
perfectly inelastic nor perfectly elastic, but it is positively inclined. The results are thus 
a combination of the previous ones. Recall that, in this case, when demand increases 
due to the program’s implementation, price and quantity rise. 
As seen above, when ah* < al*, there is an increase in nh, even when the increase in 
demand affects solely the equilibrium price (the perfectly inelastic case). When this 
effect is distributed in price and quantity, it is straightforward to conclude that nh, 
necessarily rises too. 
When ah* > al, it is uncertain what is the effect of the introduction of the program 
on nh,. From the previous results, we learned two facts: first, in the perfectly inelas-
tic case, only price increases (no quantity change) and nh, reduces; second, in the 
perfectly elastic case, only quantity increases (no price change) and nh, rises. In the 
upward sloping case, price and quantity increase. Thus, as more inelastic the supply 
curve, greater is the increase in price vis-à-vis the quantity, and it is more likely to 
occur a decrease in nh,. In other words, the price effect dominates. Whereas, the more 
elastic the supply curve, the reverse occurs and the quantity effect overrules. 
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conclusIon
In 2005, the Brazilian government launched ProUni, a program to finance university 
tuition to credit constrained families. Private universities provide scholarships to the 
target group defined by the government and receive tax exemptions in return. As 
the analysis above shows, the effect of this program on the quality of the labor force 
is ambigous. The result depends on two key variables: the university sector’s supply 
curve and the level of preparation to face university studies of the students who are 
targeted by the program vis-à-vis the non-targeted ones. 
When the program is introduced, there is an increase in demand in the university 
sector. Depending on the supply curve, three possibilities can occur. First, university 
tuition rises and total number of university students does not change, when the sup-
ply curve is perfectly inelastic. Second, price does not change and quantity increases, 
when the supply curve is perfectly elastic. Finally, price and quantity increase, when 
the supply curve has an upward slope. 
Non-target families are penalized when the university tuition rises. Some of them 
may decide to withdraw their children from university. If their levels of preparation 
are lower than the ones of the children from the target families who received the 
scholarships, then the program is capable of increasing the quality of the labor force 
by eliminating the credit constraint of better qualified students. 
However, it is more likely that the level of preparation of the individuals from the 
target group be lower. In this case, the more inelastic the supply curve, greater is the 
increase in tuition after the program’s introduction and more individuals from the 
non-target group do not go to university. As they are replaced by individuals from the 
target group who are less prepared students, the quality of the labor force drops. 
The current situation in the university sector, with an idle capacity in general around 
20%, may suggest that university tuition may not increase significantly after the 
program. However, it is possible that the level of capacity utilization may vary from 
course to course and, as a result, the effects of the program on the quality of the labor 
force may also vary across them. It would be interesting to check empirically if there 
are important changes, in the future, in the quality of those professionals graduating 
from courses operating close to full capacity today vis-à-vis the others. Moreover, one 
could argue that tuition could decrease without the program exactly because the idle 
capacity and benefit at the margin individuals better qualified to pursue university 
studies than individuals from the target group. 
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As pointed out in the introduction, 70% of all private universities joined the program 
and they have to stay in the program for at least ten years. It is true that the model in 
this paper is a static two-period model. Nevertheless, it is possible to use it to make 
some speculations about the effects of the program in the near future. 
Even if there is today, in general, idle capacity in the university sector, one could 
argue that this reality may change in the future. On the demand side, there has been 
an important increase in the number of students graduating from high school that 
is expected to continue. On the supply side, it is expected to have some important 
limitations. On the one hand, the government has important budget limitations and 
is not likely to be able to expand the number of slots available in the public uni-
versities. On the other hand, the current government has maintained a very strict 
policy regarding the authorization for new universities to start operating and old 
ones to augment their operating size. Two examples illustrate this policy. In 200, 
the Ministry of Education suspended for 0 days any authorization to create new 
courses. In 2005, in the project to reform the university sector, the same Ministry of 
Education suggested the transfer from the government to professional associations 
of the legal right to authorize the openings of new courses in some areas, such as in 
medicine. These associations tend to limit severely the number of new professionals 
(and slots in universities) in order to guarantee to their members a certain degree of 
monopoly.2 Combining the demand and supply sides, the “no idle capacity” case, in 
which the quality of the labor force declines as a result of the government’s program, 
may occur in the future. 
It is important to make one final comment. The analysis in this paper focus solely 
on the impact of the program on the quality of the labor force. It concludes that it is 
not unlikely that its impact is negative. If a more complete analysis is implemented 
it is possible that one can find that its additional impacts can be even more negative. 
In particular, if one takes into consideration the costs and the benefits of the alterna-
tive uses of the funds employed to finance the program. Therefore, a more complete 
analysis should be implemented in future research and its overall effect on economic 
welfare considered. 
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aPPEnDIX
Proposition 1: Given the equilibrium wages and university tuition, there exists an 
unique ( ,1]hha a
* ∈ , such that a parent with high level of human capital sends his child to 
university if  *≥ haa , and does not otherwise. 
Proof: Given the equilibrium wages and university tuition and using assumption , 
the utility of the family with high level of human capital with and without sending 
his child to university are, respectively, equal to: 
	
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),0 ,1 ,1( ) = ( ) 1 ( )h h lLHS a u w P a u w a u w* * * * − + β p + − p 
and 
	 ( ) ( ),0 ,1= h lRHS u w u w
* *+ β
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Note that RHS does not depend on a. 
Using the facts that π(ah) = 0 from assumption  and u′ > 0, one obtains that for any 
possible value for wl,* the following: 
	 ( ) <hLHS a RHS
Using the fact that πˊ (a) > 0 from assumption , LHS(a) is strictly increasing in a. 
Hence, the LHS and the RHS either intersect at a unique ah* > ah, or do not intersect 
at all, in which case hh aa >1=
* .   ■
Proposition 2: there exists a competitive equilibrium and it is unique. 
Proof. Proof. The equilibrium is characterized by seven unknowns ( * thw , , 
*
tlw , , 
*
,1hn , 
*
ha , 
*P ; 1,2=t ) and seven equations (the four first-order conditions of the firm’s 
problem (two in each period), the equilibrium condition in the university sector, the 
law of motion for the variable thn ,  and the threshold ability for individuals with high 
level of human capital).
Given *,0in , the the two first-order conditions of the firm’s problem at 0=t  deter-
mine *,0iw  ( lhi ,= ). Then, we are left with a system with five equations and five 
unknows. From proposition ( )1 , given the equilibrium wages and university tuition, 
there exists an unique ,1]( hh aa ∈* . From the law of motion ( )2 , one obtains an uni-
que ( )0,1,1 ∈*hn . As 1=,1,1 ** + lh nn , then there is an unique ( )0,1,1 ∈*ln . As in equili-
brium ** ,1,1 = ii nN  (for lhi ,= ), then wages are uniquely determined using the firm’s 
first-order conditions. Total number of students is equal to f(a)da
ha
∫ *1 . Therefore, at 
the margin, the university with the highest marginal cost that has student is given 
by *Xi =  in the following equation: ( ) max
0
1 =
X
ah
f a da Q idi
*
*∫ ∫ . From the first-order 
condition of this university’s problem (university *Xi = ), *P  is determined, as it 
equates price to its marginal cost. Universities with a marginal cost greater than *P  
do not operate as they maximize profits without having students. The proof is ana-
logous to the case in which 1=*ha .  ■
Proposition 3: after the introduction of the program, if the university sector’s supply curve 
is perfectly inelastic and the level of preparation of targeted students vis-à-vis the non-targe-
ted ones is greater (lower), the quality of the labor force increases (decreases). 
Proof. The following condition must hold in the competitive equilibrium with and 
without the government’s program:
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	 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),1 ,1 ,0 ,0( ) =h h l h ha u w u w u w u w P βp − − − 
In the competitive equilibrium without the program, the above equality holds with 
the combination *ha , 
*
,1hw , 
*
,1lw , and 
*P . When the program is introduced, there are 
S  new university students and, ceteris paribus, P  and ,1hn  increases and the wage 
premium reduces, which leads to an increase in the RHS  and a decrease in the LHS  
in the above equation. Hence, *ha  cannot be part of the competitive equilibrium 
anymore. To restore the equality in the above equation, ha  has to increase (which 
affects P, ,1hn  and the skill premium, reducing the RHS  and increasing the LHS ) 
such that S  old students leave the university and the number of students enrolled in 
university does not change as the university sector’s supply curve is perfectly inelastic. 
Let **ha  be the new equilibrium threshold. After the program’s introduction, the new 
,1hn  in equilibrium (call it 
**
,1hn ) is equal to:
	
,1 ,0
1= ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )lh h a ah l
an n a f a da S a g a da** * ** *p + p∫ ∫
If the level of preparation of targeted students vis-à-vis the non-targeted ones is gre-
ater ( ** lh aa < ) then 
***
,1,1 > hh nn . If it is lower ( lh aa >
* ), then *** ,1,1 < hh nn .   ■ 
Proposition 4: after the introduction of the program, if the university sector’s supply curve 
is perfectly elastic, the quality of the labor force increases. 
Proof. The following condition must hold in the competitive equilibrium with and 
without the government’s program:
	 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),1 ,1 ,0 ,0( ) =h h l h ha u w u w u w u w P βp − − − 
In the competitive equilibrium without the program, the above equality holds with 
the combination *ha , 
*
,1hw , 
*
,1lw , and 
*P . When the program is introduced, there are 
S  new university students and P  does not change as the university sector’s supply 
curve is perfectly elastic. Ceteris paribus, ,1hn  increases and the wage premium redu-
ces, which leads to a decrease in the LHS  and an increase in the RHS  in the above 
equation. Hence, *ha  cannot be part of the competitive equilibrium anymore. To 
restore the equality in the above equation, ha  has to increase (which affects ,1hn  and 
the skill premium, increasing the LHS  and decreasing the RHS ). Let **ha  and 
**
hn  
be, respectively, the new equilibrium threshold and the new fraction of individuals 
with high level of human capital. As *** hh aa > , then the new skill premium must be 
lower, indicating that  *** hh nn >  (that is, the quality of the labor force increases).  ■  
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Proposition 5:  after the introduction of the program, if the university sector’s supply curve 
is upward sloping and the level of preparation of targeted students vis-à-vis the non-targeted 
ones is greater (lower), the effect on the quality of the labor force is positive (uncertain). 
Proof. The case in this proposition is a combination of the cases in the previous two 
propositions. Therefore, the proof is a straightforward convex combination of the 
previous proofs.  ■  
